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CHAHIR ZAKI
AN OVERVIEW OF STRUCTURAL  
IMBALANCES IN EGYPT 
ABSTRACT
The Egyptian economy has been negatively affected by the political instabil-
ity that the country has witnessed since 2011. Indeed, this instability showed 
the extent to which the Egyptian economy suffers from several structural imbal-
ances that first amplified the negative effects of the revolution and then delayed 
its recovery. This paper analyzes both internal and external structural imbal-
ances that characterize the Egyptian economy and presents a roadmap for 
future reforms. Egypt is suffering from three primary levels of internal imbal-
ance: the sectoral level (a declining industrial sector with a low level of 
competitiveness), the fiscal level (between revenues and spending, current vs. 
productive spending), and the monetary level (non-transparent monetary pol-
icy). Externally, two structural imbalances can be identified, namely a high level 
of imported intermediate inputs leading to a chronic trade deficit and FDI con-
centrated in low-value-added. It is argued that the main reasons for such 
imbalances are inefficient political and economic institutions.
INTRODUCTION
In early 1990, Egypt implemented an economic reform and structural adjust-
ment program with the World Bank and International Monetary Fund. This 
program tried to rectify macroeconomic imbalances by enhancing the role of 
the market and privatizing state-owned firms.  Starting in 2004, the Egyptian 
government launched a second wave of reforms on various fronts. These reforms 
tackled several aspects of the economy, including promoting investment by 
improving the business environment and enhancing trade performance through 
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trade liberalization and reducing red tape. This resulted in high levels of GDP 
growth between 2005 and 2008 (reaching 7.2% in FY2007/08 1). 
However, the Egyptian economy was subject to two shocks that had nega-
tive implications for the economy. First, the financial crisis caused growth to fall 
to 4.7% in FY2008/09. Second, the popular uprising in January 2011 caused 
real GDP growth to fall from 5.1% in FY10 to 1.8% in FY11. It is worth noting 
that the quarter during which real GDP growth fell the furthest was during the 
revolution (January/March 2011), when it dropped to -4.3%. Growth rates 
remained constant in 2013 and 2014 at 2.2%. Thanks to more public invest-
ment, growth doubled to reach 4.2% in 2015. Nonetheless, GDP growth 
continued to be slowed by ongoing weaknesses in the manufacturing and tour-
ism sectors. Hence, the underlying cause of the current crisis lies in real 
economic imbalances, exacerbated by the recent development to which they 
gave rise (or hid, for a time). Such internal and external shocks showed to what 
extent the Egyptian economy suffers from several structural imbalances that first 
amplified the negative effects of the revolution and then delayed its recovery. 
Those imbalances are observable at the external and internal levels. 
Internally, fiscal imbalances are related to the structure of spending and reve-
nues and the disequilibrium between them. Moreover, sectoral imbalance 
involves sectoral dislocation between different economic activities. Monetary 
imbalances show how monetary policies failed to maintain low inflation rates. 
Externally, structural imbalances are related to the structure of imports, the 
exchange policy and the sectoral allocation of foreign direct investment (FDI). 
This paper makes three contributions. First, it analyzes both internal and 
external structural imbalances that characterize the Egyptian economy. Second, 
it attempts to show how such imbalances reduced the potential GDP of Egypt 
and consequently delayed its recovery. Finally, it argues that such imbalances 
are primarily caused by inefficient political and economic institutions and pro-
vides a roadmap for future reforms.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents internal imbalances, 
including monetary, fiscal and sectoral imbalances. Section 3 presents external 
ones, with a special focus on FDI, import structure and exchange rate policy. 
Section 4 attempts to explain these imbalances using a political economy 
approach. Section 5 offers a conclusion.
1. Fiscal Year (FY) in Egypt starts in July and ends in June.
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INTERNAL IMBALANCES 
Sectoral Imbalances
Disaggregating GDP by economic activity shows that the Egyptian eco-
nomy heavily depends on services. Previously, services had comprised an 
increasing share of GDP, reaching 57% in 2010. However, this share fell 
slightly to 52% in FY14, due to the significant decline in tourism. Meanwhile, 
the share comprised by agriculture has fallen consistently, from 30% in FY72 
to 14% in FY14 (Figure 1). 
Figure 1. GDP by Economic Activity (by percentage of GDP)
Source: Ministry of Planning
Furthermore, the manufacturing sector share has remained relatively low, 
not exceeding 30%. Indeed, this sector has faced several problems that affected 
its competitiveness (especially institutional barriers as it is shown in Figure 2). 
Indeed, Figure 2 shows that Egypt (compared to other comparable economies, 
such as Tunisia, Morocco, Jordan, Lebanon, Brazil, Poland and Turkey) is suffer-
ing from a lack of rule of law, low protection of property rights, a lack of market 
competition and the relative absence of anti-monopoly practices and laws. 
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Figure 2. Institutional Barriers
Source: Source: Rule of Law, Market-based competition and Anti-monopoly policy indices 
come from Bertelsmann Transformation Index. A greater value of the index shows a better per-
formance of the country (from 1 to 10). Property rights and Transparency of government 
policymaking come from the Global Competitiveness Index. A greater value of the index shows 
a better performance of the country (from 1 to 10).
Moreover, the innovative capacity in Egypt is relatively low, which in turn 
affects its competitiveness (Figure 3) and increases its specialization in tradi-
tional exports. Indeed, Figure 4 shows that Egypt has a low share of medium- and 
high-tech activities in its industrial sector. 
Figure 3. Capacity for Innovation
Source: Competitive Industrial Performance
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Figure 4. Share of medium- and high-tech activities
Source: Competitive Industrial Performance
A number of other problems affect the industrial sector in southern-Mediter-
ranean countries (Altunberg, 2011). First, there are strong rent-seeking activities, 
which are not constrained by effective checks and balances. This leads to the 
misallocation of funds, political capture and the creation of perverse incentives 
for investors and bureaucrats. Second, few countries have policy think tanks 
that are likely to review policy experiments and inform policymaking. This sug-
gests that a number of industrial strategies are not evidence-based. Third, 
industrial policies are generally not well-coordinated with other related poli-
cies, such as those related to Small and Medium Enterprises (SME), investment 
promotion, trade, or science and technology. Fourth, the business community is 
highly fragmented. Production systems in all of the countries in our sample are 
fragmented along different lines (micro/small vs. large firms; state-owned or 
-related (military or party-affiliated) vs. private enterprises; national and for-
eign-funded; ethnic minority-owned and other domestic firms). Such 
fragmentation decreases inter-firm specialization and obstructs factor mobility 
between groups of firms, as well as knowledge spillovers from efficient to 
less-efficient firms. All these problems lead the industrial sector to comprise a 
small share of GDP, contributing products that are not labor intensive and are 
low-value-added. This is why Egypt’s social accounting matrices show that the 
share of capital in the total value added increased from 57% in FY76 to 73% in 
FY11 (see Table 1). This is in line with the findings of Kheir-El-Din and Moursi 
(2007), who argue that between 1960 and 1998 capital accumulation was the 
main driving force behind economic growth. This was mainly due to the sub-
stantial supply of unqualified labor and prevailing employment laws that 
fostered the adoption of capital-intensive production techniques. These policies 
have led to modest investment levels that are biased against labor-intensive 
growth, which have weakened the economy’s ability to create jobs. 
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Table 1. Capital and Labour Shares of Total Value Added (percentage)







Source: Constructed by the authors using different SAM
This is why in order to resolve sectoral imbalances, it is crucial to increase 
both the share and the competitiveness of the industrial sector in order to boost 
its production, exports and employment. 
Fiscal Imbalances
At the fiscal level, Egypt has long been characterized by a structural fiscal 
deficit. In the wake of the popular uprising, the Egyptian economy experienced 
low growth, as well as a higher fiscal deficit (see Table 2) for two reasons: the 
significant increase in wages and salaries after the revolution and the increase 
in interest payments (8.8% of GDP in FY16) due to a higher domestic debt (up 
to 85.8% of GDP in FY16 from 70.5% in FY11). Moreover, state revenues 
remained almost constant. This is why, despite the subsidies reforms that 
reduced energy subsidies in July 2014 and November 2016, 2 the overall fiscal 
deficit widened to 12.3% in FY16, up from 11.5% a year before and 9.5% 
before the revolution. 
2. In July 2014, the Government of Egypt partially removed energy subsidies on all 
fuel products (except LPG for needy households) and electricity, to be phased out 
entirely over the medium-term, in order to reduce the fiscal deficit. This decrease is 
mainly explained by the elimination of energy subsidies to energy-intensive sectors, 
such as those producing petrochemicals, aluminum, ceramic and steel. Energy 
intensive sectors are responsible for around 80% of total fuel oil consumption and 
15% of total natural gas usage. Both fuel oil and natural gas account for approximately 
25% of total energy subsidies. In November 2016, the government announced a 
second decrease in subsidies before signing the International Monetary Fund loan. 
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Table 2. Summary of Fiscal Operations (in percent of GDP)
FY11 FY12 FY13 FY14 FY15 FY16 FY17
Total revenues 19.3 18.3 19 21.7 19.1 17.7 20.6
  Tax revenues 14 12.5 13.6 12.4 12.6 12.7 13.3
  Non-tax revenues 5.3 5.8 5.4 9.3 6.6 5 7.3
Total expenditure 29.3 28.4 31.9 33.4 30.2 29.5 30
  Compensation of employees 7 7.4 7.8 8.5 8.2 7.7 7
  Interest payments 6.2 6.3 8 8.2 7.9 8.8 9
Primary deficit 3.6 3.8 5 3.9 3.6 3.6 0.8
Cash deficit 10 10.1 12.9 11.6 11 11.8 9.4
Overall deficit 9.8 10.1 13 12.2 11.5 12.3 9.8
Source: Ministry of Finance
Note: Figures for 2016/17 are preliminary. 
A closer look at the structure of social spending reveals the fiscal imbal-
ances from which Egypt is suffering. Indeed, social expenditure is quite modest; 
the share of spending on health and education (which affect human capital) 
never exceeded 7% between FY02 and FY12 (Table 3). Furthermore, public 
investment decreased from 5% in FY02 to 1.9% in FY12. The decrease in these 
types of spending obviously has an impact on medium- and long-term growth. 
Indeed, most public spending is allocated to current expenditure (wages, subsi-
dies and interest payments), while a minor part is allocated to productive 
expenditure (education, health and infrastructure). 
Table 3. Summary of Social Spending (percentage of GDP)
FY05 FY06 FY07 FY08 FY09 FY10 FY11 FY12
Education* 4.8 4.1 3.7 3.7 4.2 4.1 3.8 4.0
Health* 1.3 1.6 1.4 1.5 1.5 1.4 1.5 1.5
Subsidies** 2.6 8.8 7.2 9.4 9.0 7.8 8.1 8.8
  Food sub.** 0.0 1.5 1.3 1.8 2.0 1.4 2.4 2.0
  Energy sub.** 0.0 6.8 5.4 6.7 6.0 5.5 4.9 6.2
Social Benefits** 2.6 2.0 0.2 0.5 2.8 0.4 0.4 0.6
Public Investment** 3.7 2.9 2.8 3.1 3.3 3.2 2.4 1.9
Sources: *CAPMAS (2010, 2011 and 2012)
** Ministry of Finance (2012)
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The deficit was primarily financed through local sources, and particularly 
through bank subscriptions for treasury bills. This increased the crowding out 
effect as net claims on the government increased at the expense of credit to the 
private sector, in order to finance the increasing budget deficit (Figure 5). This 
evolution also shows how fiscal imbalances have had negative consequences 
on growth determinants in the medium- and long-term. 
Figure 5. Net claims on the government are crowding out private sector credit 
Source: Ministry of Finance, the Financial Monthly, various issues.
To attract savings, interest rates on government bills and bonds have 
increased to an average of 14% in 2014. Consequently, the outstanding stock of 
treasury bills (TBs) has increased substantially over the period from 2002-2014, 
as shown in Figure 6.
Figure 6. Outstanding stock of Treasury Bills (TBs) (LE billion)
Source: Ministry of Finance, the Financial Monthly, various issues.
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As the interest rate on treasury bills (TBs) increased, they became more 
attractive, which led to a decrease in the risk premium (the difference between 
the real lending rate and the real treasury bill rate), as Figure 7 shows.
Figure 7. Risk Premium (percentage)
Source: Ministry of Finance, the Financial Monthly, various issues.
Monetary Imbalances
Monetary policy in Egypt suffers from two main problems. First, it lacks 
clearly defined objectives, either legislative or otherwise. When the Banking 
Law was issued in 2003, monetary policy became formally geared towards 
achieving price stability. “Law No. 88 of 2003 of the “Central Bank, Banking 
Sector and Monetary System” entrusts the Central Bank of Egypt (CBE) with the 
formulation and implementation of monetary policy, with price stability being 
the primary and overriding objective. The CBE is committed to achieving, over 
the medium term, low rates of inflation, which it believes are essential for main-
taining confidence and for sustaining high rates of investment and economic 
growth. The Government’s endorsement of the objective of price stability and its 
commitment to fiscal consolidation is quite important for achieving this objec-
tive” (CBE website). Yet, there is no mention of a numerical target for inflation. 
While the law refrained from citing real objectives (output and employment), 
CBE reports mention that low inflation must “maintain high rates of investment 
and economic growth” (CBE, 2004/2005).
Second, the Central Bank of Egypt provides neither operational transparency 
(by publishing regular reports with the expected inflation), nor numerical trans-
parency (since it does not have numerical inflation targets). This is why monetary 
policy remains uncertain and expectations are not concrete. Hence, a more 
independent and transparent, and thus credible, Central Bank will help to solid-
ify expectations and consequently make monetary policy more effective in 
achieving its goals. 
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Two points are worth mentioning. First, a lax monetary policy is one of the 
reasons why inflation has been volatile (see Figure 8). Indeed, a more expan-
sionary monetary policy is associated with higher inflation. 
Figure 8. The Correlation between Money Supply and Inflation
Source: Constructed by the authors using the World Development Indicators
Second, domestic inflation is still highly affected by changes to the dollar 
exchange rate. Indeed, in November 2016, the CBE announced its decision to 
move, with immediate effect, to a liberalized exchange rate regime in order to 
address distortions in the domestic foreign currency market. At the end of 
2016, the Egyptian pound was floated against the US dollar to reach EGP 13 
per USD. By early 2017, the exchange rate reached 18 EGP per USD (Figure 
9) leading inflation rates (Figure 10) to soar, reaching over 25% in December 
2016, the highest level in almost 12 years. In addition, the Central Bank raised 
interest rates by 300 basis points on the day it floated the pound. High infla-
tion levels will definitely put pressure on households in a country where 
around 27% of people are living under the national poverty line. 
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Figure 9. Exchange Rate Developments
Source: The Central Bank of Egypt
Figure 10. Inflation Rate Development
Source: The Central Bank of Egypt
In a nutshell, Egypt is suffering from three main internal imbalances: at the 
sectoral level (a declining industrial sector with a low level of competitiveness), 
the fiscal level (between revenues and spending, current vs. productive spend-




Export and Import Structures 
In the aftermath of the revolution, Egypt’s external accounts became more 
fragile for three main reasons. First, the current account balance deficit 
increased to $7.9 billion (3.1% of GDP) from $2.7 billion (1.2% of GDP) in 
FY12. This was primarily due to the rise in the trade deficit, which increased 
by 33.2% due to more imports and fewer exports. It is worth noting that 
around 75% of Egyptian imports are raw materials, intermediate inputs, 
investment goods or fuel. This is why, with the Egyptian pound devaluation, 
the potential increase in exports might be offset by more costly and imports 
that cannot be reduced. 
Figure 11. Import Structure
Source: The Central Bank of Egypt.
Yet, despite the increased trade deficit, the current account was in equilib-
rium or surplus before the financial crisis due to strong surpluses in the services 
(mainly tourism) and transfer accounts. Following the revolution, net service 
receipts fell by 30%, down to $7370.4 million, due to a decline in tourism 
receipts. Net transfer receipts also fell in FY15 due to lower oil prices. In FY15, 
the trade deficit was greater than the surplus generated by services and trans-
fers, leading to a current account deficit (-3.7%).
Second, Egypt experienced a significant capital outflow of both portfolio 
and FDI, which were uneven throughout FY11. For this reason, the capital and 
financial account registered a deficit, which equaled 2% of GDP (see Table 4). 
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This deficit declined slightly but the surplus increased in FY15 thanks to more 
net borrowing from the rest of the world.
Table 4. Balance of Payments in Egypt as a Share of GDP (percentage), FY10-FY15
FY10 FY11 FY12 FY13 FY14 FY15
Balance of Current Account -2.0% -2.6% -3.7% -2.2% -0.9% -3.7%
Trade Balance -11.5% -11.5% -12.4% -10.7% -11.3% -11.8%
Services Balance 6.7% 5.9% 4.4% 4.4% 2.7% 3.2%
Investment Income Balance (net) -2.0% -2.6% -2.3% -2.6% -2.4% -1.7%
Transfers 4.8% 5.6% 6.7% 6.7% 10.1% 6.6%
Capital & Financial Account 4.1% -1.8% 0.4% 3.4% 1.7% 5.4%
Capital Account 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% 0.0%
Financial Account 4.1% -1.8% 0.4% 3.4% 1.7% 5.5%
  Direct Investment In Egypt (net) 3.1% 0.9% 1.4% 1.3% 1.4% 1.9%
  Portfolio Investment in Egypt (net) 3.6% -1.1% -1.8% 0.5% 0.4% -0.2%
  Other Investment (net) -1.9% -1.2% 0.9% 1.7% -0.1% 3.8%
Overall Balance 1.5% -4.1% -4.1% 0.1% 0.5% 1.1%
Change in CBE reserve assets -3355.7 9753.9 11278.4 -237 -1478.6 -3724.9
Source: Central Bank of Egypt 
Note: For the change in CBE reserves, a negative sign means an increase
As a consequence, international reserves declined from $36 billion in 
December 2010 to $26.4 billion in June 2011, $15.5 billion in June 2012 and 
$15.4 billion in January 2015. This is chiefly attributed to the Central Bank’s 
efforts to defend the Egyptian pound. In December 2012, Egypt’s central bank 
introduced a new system for buying and selling foreign currency through cur-
rency auctions and the Egyptian pound decreased to reach EGP6.70/$1 in 
March 2013. It experienced a further depreciation in early 2015, when the CBE 
announced that the value of the dollar was 7.61EGP. Finally, while the dollar 
reached an official rate of EGP 8.88, on the parallel market it reached EGP 18.
Finally, an important aspect of the trade policy is that of trade barriers. 
Indeed, in order to boost exports and imports, Egypt has signed several trade 
agreements and reduced its tariffs. However, despite these liberalization efforts, 
other impediments to trade still exist, especially administrative barriers that 
remain high and costly. Procedures entail a high number of documents, which 




Table 5. Export and Import Procedures, 2015
Indicator Egypt MENA OECD
Documents to export (number) 8 6 4
Time to export (days) 12 19.4 10.5
Cost to export (USD per container) 625 1,166.3 1,080.3
Documents to import (number) 10 8 4
Time to import (days) 15 23.8 9.6
Cost to import (USD per container) 790 1,307 1,100.4
Source: World Bank (2015b), Doing Business Indicators
FDI Drawbacks 
FDI in Egypt increased between 2005 and 2008 after Egypt adopted a 
series of reforms that attracted FDI from European and Arab investors. 
Therefore, FDI multiplied 17-fold from 2003 to 2008. Yet, due to the financial 
crisis and the revolution, FDI declined by 72% between 2009 and 2015 (see 
Figure 12). In looking at the sectoral distribution of FDI in Egypt, the petro-
leum sector ranks first, followed by the services sector (Figure 13). This 
explains why the FDI inflow in Egypt did not generate enough jobs. Indeed, 
extractive industries are primarily capital intensive rather than labor intensive 
and their value added is extremely low. 
Figure 12. Net FDI in Egypt (% GDP)
Source: Central Bank of Egypt.
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Figure 13. Total FDI in Egypt by Economic Sector 2011/2012
Source: Central Bank of Egypt (2012)
Hence, external structural imbalances can be summarized as follows: a high 
level of imported intermediate inputs leading to a chronic trade deficit and FDI 
concentrated in low-value-added sectors.
A POLITICAL ECONOMY EXPLANATION 
The most important cause of these imbalances in Egypt is institutional defi-
ciency. Indeed, according to Acemoglu and Robinson (2008), modeling 
institutions include economic institutions, political power and political institu-
tions. First, economic institutions matter for economic growth because they 
shape the incentives of key economic actors in society. Particularly, they affect 
investments in physical and human capital, as well as technology and the orga-
nization of production. However, since institutions have an influence on the 
distribution of economic gains, not all individuals and groups prefer the same 
set of economic institutions. Consequently, a conflict of interest arises among 
various groups and individuals over the choice of economic institutions, and 
the political power of the different groups becomes the deciding factor. Finally, 
political institutions determine the constraints on and the incentives of the key 
actors in the political sphere. These institutions may vary depending on the form 
of government, democracy versus dictatorship or autocracy, and the extent of 
constraints on politicians and political elite. Therefore, as is shown in Figure 14, 
economic performance depends chiefly on political institutions that shape de 
jure political power and on the distribution of resources that determine de facto 
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political power. Both of them determine economic and political institutions that 
affect economic performance. This is why bad economic performance (mani-
fested by structural imbalances) results from inefficient institutions. 
Figure 14. The link between Economic Performance and Institutions
Source: Acemoglu and Robinson (2008).
Although institutions matter for the economy to function well, it is difficult 
to measure some of their aspects. The literature focuses on the frequency of 
coups and revolutions as a proxy for government stability (Barro, 1991), the size 
of the black market and the percentage of national income in “contract inten-
sive” activities as proxies for the effectiveness of economic institutions (Clague 
et al.1996), the risk of nationalization, the prevalence of corruption, and the 
efficiency of dispute resolution procedures (Knack and Keefer, 1995). 
 A host of indicators shows that Egypt is low-ranked compared to its 
peer economies in the region. Indeed, the Index of Economic Freedom 3 (IEF) 
shows that most of the 15 MENA countries graded are “moderately free” or 
“mostly unfree,” with Iran and Algeria considered to be “repressed.” Egypt is 
“mostly unfree,” as are Yemen, Tunisia, and Lebanon. By contrast, Bahrain, the 
Emirates, Qatar, and Israel are “mostly free” (Table 6a). A closer look into the 
components of the IEF (Tables 6b) shows that most of the indicators are “moder-
ately free,” such as government spending, business freedom and monetary 
freedom. The only indicator that is “free” is fiscal freedom, while trade is “mostly 
free.” At the bottom, both labor freedom and investment freedom are “mostly 
unfree,” followed by property rights corruption and financial freedom, which 
3. In the Index of Economic Freedom, the Heritage Foundation evaluates countries 
in four broad policy areas that affect economic freedom: rule of law, government size, 
regulatory efficiency, and market openness. There are 10 specific categories: property 
rights, freedom from corruption, fiscal freedom, government spending, business 
freedom, labor freedom, monetary freedom, trade freedom, investment freedom, and 
financial freedom. Scores in these categories are averaged to create an overall score. 
Based on an average score, each of 178 countries graded in the 2015 Index is 
classified as “free” (i.e., combined scores of 80 or higher); “mostly free” (70-79.9); 
“moderately free” (60-69.9); “mostly unfree” (50-59.9); or “repressed” (under 50). 
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are “repressed.” This shows that Egypt’s world rank (124) is lower than other 
countries such as Tunisia (107), Lebanon (94), Morocco (89) and Jordan (38). 
Table 6a. 2015 IEF for Selected MENA countries
World Rank Region Rank 2015 Score
Change in Yearly 
Score from 2014
Iran 171 15 41.8 1.5
Algeria 157 14 48.9 -1.9
Yemen 133 13 53.7 -1.8
Egypt 124 12 55.2 2.3
Tunisia 107 11 57.7 0.4
Lebanon 94 10 59.3 -0.1
Morocco 89 9 60.1 1.8
Saudi Arabia 77 8 62.1 -0.1
Kuwait 74 7 62.5 0.2
Oman 56 6 66.7 -0.7
Jordan 38 5 69.3 0.1
Israel 33 4 70.5 2.1
Qatar 32 3 70.8 -0.4
UAE 25 2 72.4 1.0
Bahrain 18 1 73.4 -1.7
Source: 2015 Index of Economic Freedom, the Heritage Foundation.
Note: Countries (total of 178 countries graded) are classified as “free” for an IEF score of 80 or 
higher, “mostly free” for an IEF score between 70 and 79.9, “moderately free” between 60 and 
69.9, “mostly unfree” between 50 and 59.9 or “repressed” for an IEF score under 50.




Tables 6b. Performance in Aspects of Economic Freedom Entering 














Algeria 30.0 36.0 80.0 38.7 66.6 50.5
Bahrain 60.0 48.0 99.9 73.1 72.5 83.1
Egypt 20.0 32.0 85.8 68.0 65.4 53.6
Iran 10.0 25.0 81.2 93.0 57.0 51.3
Iraq N/A 16.0 N/A 43.8 57.7 74.4
Israel 75.0 61.0 61.9 47.8 72.4 67.1
Jordan 60.0 45.0 93.7 70.7 59.1 74.4
Kuwait 45.0 43.0 97.7 61.1 58.6 64.2
Lebanon 20.0 28.0 91.3 70.6 54.7 60.7
Libya 10.0 15.0 95.0 37.5 46.8 66.7
Morocco 40.0 37.0 70.9 61.0 68.8 33.4
Oman 55.0 47.0 98.5 44.2 68.4 76.1
Qatar 70.0 68.0 99.7 71.9 70.5 71.2
Saudi-Ar. 40.0 46.0 99.7 61.9 65.8 72.7
Syria 10.0 17.0 N/A N/A 57.3 49.1
Tunisia 40.0 41.0 74.3 70.8 81.2 69.1
UAE 55.0 69.0 99.5 85.8 74.7 83.8









Algeria 71.2 60.8 25.0 30.0
Bahrain 74.2 78.6 65.0 80.0
Egypt 67.4 70.0 50.0 40.0
Iran 48.7 41.4 0.0 10.0
Iraq 73.6 N/A N/A N/A
Israel 81.6 88.6 80.0 70.0
Jordan 80.6 79.6 70.0 60.0
Kuwait 74.0 76.2 55.0 50.0
Lebanon 72.0 75.8 60.0 60.0
Libya 71.4 80.0 5.0 20.0
Morocco 81.9 78.2 70.0 60.0
Oman 76.2 76.8 65.0 60.0
Qatar 79.7 81.8 45.0 50.0
Saudi-Ar. 68.4 76.4 40.0 50.0
Syria N/A N/A 0.0 20.0
Tunisia 74.8 61.2 35.0 30.0
UAE 83.8 82.4 40.0 50.0
Yemen 68.5 77.6 50.0 30.0
Source: 2015 Index of Economic Freedom, the Heritage Foundation.
Note: UAE refers to the United Arab Emirates.
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Moreover, data from the Worldwide Governance Indicators 4 (WGI) shows 
that Egypt, which was initially an “average” performer (Figure 15), dropped 
drastically in the percentile ranking between 1996 and 2013, losing 20 to 25 
points in each indicator. This holds for control of corruption (with a percentile 
rank of 32.5), government effectiveness (19.6), rule of law (34.1), voice and 
accountability (18.1), regulatory quality (26.3) and political stability (7.1). By 
contrast, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Malta, and Israel are the region’s top 
performers in “Control of Corruption,” “Government Effectiveness,” “Regulatory 
Quality,” and “Rule of Law,” holding percentile ranks of 70 and above. The only 
countries ranked below Egypt overall are Iran, Syria, Yemen, Libya and Palestine. 
Figures 15. Worldwide Governance Indicators for MENA Countries in Percentile Rank, 2013





(c) Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism
(d) Regulatory Quality
(e) Rule of Law
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(f) Voice and Accountability 
Source: World Governance Indicators, the World Bank.
Note: Percentile rank indicates the country’s rank among all countries covered by the aggregate 
indicator, with 0 corresponding to lowest rank, and 100 to highest rank.  Percentile ranks have 
been adjusted to correct for changes over time in the composition of the countries covered by 
the WGI.
A similar conclusion can also be drawn from the Global Competitiveness 
Index, 5 (GCI) as Egypt is ranked between 100 and 130 among 144 countries. 
Indeed, when it is compared to Jordan, it is quite clear that the indices that have 
a particularly low rank are property rights, intellectual property protection, 
diversion of public funds, public trust in politicians, wastefulness of government 
spending, efficiency of legal framework in settling disputes, reliability of police 
services, strength of auditing and reporting standards, efficacy of corporate 
boards and protection of minority shareholders’ interests (Figure 16).
5. The Global Competitiveness Index has been used since 2005 by the World 
Economic Forum as a comprehensive tool that measures the microeconomic and 
macroeconomic foundations of national competitiveness. It is a weighted average of 
many different components, each measuring a different aspect of competitiveness 
grouped into 12 pillars: institutions, infrastructure, macroeconomic environment, 
health and primary education, higher education and training, goods market efficiency, 
labor market efficiency, financial market development, technological readiness, 
market size, business sophistication, and innovation.
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Figure 16. Rank of GCI Institutional Indicators, 2014-2015
Source: The Global Competitiveness Report 2014-2015, World Economic Forum.
Note: Indicators are derived from the World Economic Forum’s annual Executive Opinion 
Survey. Indicators not derived from the Survey are identified by an asterisk (*). The value 
included in the table is the country’s rank among the 144 economies included in the Index.
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE REFORMS 
The Egyptian economy has been negatively affected by the political instabil-
ity that the country has witnessed since 2011. Indeed, this instability showed 
the extent to which the Egyptian economy suffers from several structural imbal-
ances that first amplified the negative effects of the revolution and then delayed 
its recovery. This paper analyzes both internal and external structural imbal-
ances that characterize the Egyptian economy and presents a roadmap for 
future reforms. Egypt is suffering from three primary levels of internal imbal-
ance: the sectoral level (a declining industrial sector with a low level of 
competitiveness), the fiscal level (between revenues and spending, current vs. 
productive spending), and the monetary level (non-transparent monetary 
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policy). Externally, two structural imbalances can be identified, namely a high 
level of imported intermediate inputs leading to a chronic trade deficit and FDI 
concentrated in low-value-added sectors.
To reduce such imbalances, more efficient institutions are necessary. First, as 
a general rule, independence and accountability are important determinants of 
good institutions. Second, as institutions are the societal “rules of the game,” or 
the humanly-devised constraints that shape human interaction, investing in 
education generally leads to better outcomes, better choices and therefore bet-
ter rules (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2008). 
In terms of reforms, the government should adopt three main principles 
while implementing future reforms. The first principle is coordination. Different 
policies should be coordinated to guarantee that they are pushing the economy 
in the right direction. The second one is transparency. The more transparent the 
government, the more understandable its decisions are to the public, and thus 
the easier it is to control expectations. The third one is gradualism. Decisions 
should be implemented in a gradual way, so as to avoid strong shocks that neg-
atively impact the poor. For instance, even though liberalizing the exchange 
rate and reducing energy subsidies were necessary decisions for the health of 
the Egyptian economy, it would have been better to implement these reforms in 
a more gradual fashion. 
More specifically, for each structural imbalance, some recommendations 
can be made as follows. At the fiscal level, as the Egyptian government has 
already started to reduce energy subsidies and implement new taxes, it is 
important to generate more revenues and allocate higher amounts to education 
and health, as they are important determinants of growth in the medium- and 
short-term. In addition, the question of safety nets (such as Takaful and Karama) 
will be central, as more subsidies are expected to be phased-out. Indeed, the 
Takaful and Karama program is being developed as a targeted national social 
safety net program, aimed at protecting the poor through income support. It is 
expected to increase its coverage during 2017 to reduce the negative effects of 
the adjustment program that Egypt has started to implement with the IMF. 
At the sectoral level, to promote industry, incentives are an important deter-
minant of industrial sector performance. As argued by El Haddad (2016), 
incentives should be performance-based, finite, pre-announced and enforced, 
along with constant independent monitoring and evaluation. Second, improv-
ing administrative procedures and reducing bureaucracy and red tape will 
increase incentives for producers. Third, as also suggested by El Haddad (2016), 
it is crucial to improve the economy’s competitive environment and accentuate 
equality of opportunity between all market players (including public, private, 
foreign firms and the army). Fourth, it is necessary to cultivate an educated 
workforce and improve matching between the education system and labour 
market requirements.
At the monetary policy level, institutional reforms are necessary to lower 
inflation. Indeed, several studies showed that central bank independence was 
negatively correlated with average inflation among developed economies. 
Central bank independence must be based on the idea that the central bank has 
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its own objectives, but must also take into account the government’s objectives 
when deciding on policy. More transparency will also lead to more credibility 
and more anchored expectations and thus lower inflation. 
At the external level, export promotion is the only way to reduce imbal-
ances. Indeed, more facilitation for exports is needed, i.e. less bureaucracy and 
fewer implicit impediments to trade in order to increase the number of exports, 
the number of destinations served by the same exporters and the number of 
products exported by each exporter. 
Finally, while promoting FDI, the government should attract it to the manu-
facturing sector in order to generate a higher value added and create more jobs. 
In fact, job creation has been dominated by low-productivity sectors in most 
MENA economies, and especially Egypt, while the employment shares of the 
manufacturing and services sectors have remained relatively low (EBRD, 2013). 
A transfer of resources to more productive and higher value-added sectors will 
be an important determinant of sustainable and labor-intensive growth, which 
will help attract more FDI to sectors with strong job-creation potential
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ANNEXE 
The World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators consist of six compo-
site indicators covering broad dimensions of governance in over 200 countries 
since 1996: Voice and Accountability, Political Stability and Absence of 
Violence/Terrorism, Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of 
Law, and Control of Corruption. These indicators are based on several hun-
dred variables obtained from 31 different data sources, capturing governance 
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perceptions as reported by survey respondents, non-governmental organiza-
tions, commercial business information providers, and public sector 
organizations worldwide. Control of Corruption captures perceptions of the 
extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both 
petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as “capture” of the state by elites 
and private interests. Government Effectiveness captures perceptions of the 
quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its 
independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and 
implementation, and the credibility of the government’s commitment to such 
policies. Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism captures per-
ceptions of the likelihood that the government will be destabilized or 
overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, including politically moti-
vated violence and terrorism. Regulatory Quality captures perceptions of the 
ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and 
regulations that permit and promote private sector development. Rule of Law 
captures perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and 
abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforce-
ment, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of 
crime and violence. Voice and Accountability captures perceptions of the 
extent to which a country’s citizens are able to participate in selecting their 
government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and 
freedom of media.
